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exploitation opening variety of context
I propose that these principles of abduction, being conducive to survival, constitute a fundamental "logic" or heuristic of learning, which is applicable, with appropriate elaborations and enrichments, on all levels of learning/development/adaptation: on the level of individual people, organizations, industries and national economies. Furthermore, this "logic" should also help to indicate how the different levels tie into each other. Of course, this is a mere hypothesis, that has to be argued in more detail and then tested extensively. I note that it has in fact been inspired from the work of the developmental psychologist Jean Piaget (1970 Piaget ( , 1974 Flavell 1967 ) on individual cognition.
I emphasize that while in a procedural sense the heuristic is optimal, it need not yield a unique or optimal outcome. It allows for pathdependence and suboptimal outcomes, and the path taken depends on context and coincidence. Different economies can develop different structures. I put "logic" between quotation marks, because it is a heuristic rather than a logic in the sense of indicating a sequence of stages that is logically or epistemologically necessary. It is a heuristic in the sense that it is generally the best answer to the problem of abduction; the best way of exploring while maintaining exploitation. However, stages will overlap: there is generalization during consolidation, differentiation during generalization, exploration of novel combinations during reciprocation. Stages may occasionally even be skipped, and innovation can occur less systematically, more randomly and spontaneously (Cook & Yanow 1993) , when an obvious opportunity presents itself without much exploration. But as a general rule one needs to accumulate failures to build up the need for change, as well as hints in what directions to look: indications what changes could be made with some chance of success.
Scripts
To proceed, I need to make the principles more concrete. The construct I am looking for should have the following features. First it should allow for levels of more and less fundamental change: "lower level" innovation of components versus "higher level" "architectural innovation" (Henderson & Clark 1990) . Second, the construct should permit the notion of parallel architectures that can exchange components, in reciprocation. Third, it should show how novel architectures can arise as novel combinations of components from different previous architectures. Fourth, it should allow for a multi-level theory: for `c onnecting learning on the individual, organizational and industrial levels.
The notion of a script, taken from cognitive science, appears to offer the simplest construct with such features (Abelson 1976, Shank and Abelson 1977) . It was used before to model organizations by Gioia and Poole (1984) . Applications of the notion in cognitive science show that a single, deterministic script does not suffice as a full model of competence but it can form an important building block: actual practices should be seen not as single scripts but as stochastic collections of different variations upon a script for different conditions (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, Thagard 1989) . In other words: it should allow for differentiation.
Figure 2: script
As illustrated in figure 2, a script consists of a sequence of nodes, which act as "components". With these nodes correspond sets of events or actions, which are "substituted" into the node (like values into a mathematical variable). Some of these substitutions come from within the script (preceding nodes) and others from outside (e.g. supplier firms). The node produces outcomes which are substituted into other (subsequent) nodes in the script, or into nodes of outside scripts (e.g. customers). Substitution into a node allows for a range of different "permissible alternatives" or "functional equivalents", that satisfy conditions corresponding with the node in its place in the script. These constraints can be more or less restrictive. Substitution is also called "assimilation" or "parametric change", while the reconfiguration of a script, with nodes that may also originate from outside the script, is called "accommodation" 2 or "architectural change". The latter implements the Schumpeterian notion of (radical) innovation as "novel combinations".
The sequence of the script may be temporal, logical or causal. Consider this example taken from Shank & Abelson (1977) . In a restaurant script, the nodes represent sequential activities of entering, seating, ordering, eating, paying and leaving. Each of these can be done in different ways. For example: paying cash, by cheque, bank card, credit card or chip card.
The notion of a script was conceived in cognitive science as a model of mental constructs. It models the idea that to make sense of data (transform them into information) they need to be substituted into nodes in the script that represents one's cognitive, categorial framework or "absorptive capacity". The notion is of interest also in economics and business, to model consumption, production and industry structure. In consumption the script represents the condition that some product has utility to a user only to the extent that it fits into nodes of the user's scripts. Radical product innovation can be defined as one which can no longer be fitted into a user script, and requires the user to adopt or develop a novel script.
On the firm level it yields a specification of the notion of an organizational routine (Cyert & arch 1963 , Nelson & Winter 1982 . It gives a representation of the use of technologies, embodied in assets and used by people, as substitutions into a node, embedded in an organizational structure of coordination (the script). Thus it models two notions of "competence": technological and organizational. This implements the idea that the use of technology requires an organizational competence, and that technological competencies are embedded in organizations. The script respresents how competence in general and knowledge in particular are socially constructed and embedded. Larger, more complex and more integrated firms have scripts with more branches and more nodes. Organizational scripts, and nodes within it, generate outcomes which are fitted into outside user scripts of customers of the firm. Conditions on substitutions into a node serve to ensure that the node maintains its fit in the script and the scripts of customers and suppliers.
The script also models the notion of systemic versus stand-alone technologies: in the first case the restrictions on substitutions into nodes are narrow and in the second they are wide. In a systemic innovation, an innovative substitution no longer satisfies the conditions: it would make the operation of other nodes infeasible. To be allowed as a substitute, adaptations would also need to be made in other nodes. Note that this can refer to producer scripts (production systemic) or user scripts (product systemic). One can, in principle, have stand alone technologies producing systemic products and vice versa. In the context of transaction cost economics, we can render the notion of "dedicated assets" as the tailoring of some asset to fit a substitution into a node of a transaction partner's script, in order to satisfy restrictions that are specific to the firm in question. The notion of assets that are complementary between two scripts is rendered as assets that yield substitutions into nodes in both scripts; economy of scope is rendered as different scripts having shared nodes or substitutions. Within the firm, the script itself is the selection environment: activities survive to the extent that they fit.
I further propose a principle of recursiveness: scripts are nested. When we put a magnifying glass to a node in a script, substitutions into the node are also seen to issue from one or more (sub)scripts. Also, in general a script is embedded in higher level (super)scripts, in the sense that it produces a substitution into a node of the superscript. Organizational scripts have a nesting of subscripts, going down into scripts embodied in neural networks of people. And they produce substitutions into nodes of industrial superscripts. On different levels of aggregation (individual, firm, industry, economy), the script serves to model the "lower level" or "parametric" change of differentiation as novel substitutions into nodes, or novel branches of scripts, obtained from novel contexts found in generalization, and "higher level" or "architectural" as a reconstitution and reconfiguration of nodes.
To follow up on the example of the restaurant script, branching here entails a different ordering of basically the same nodes in a service and in a self-service restaurant: in the former seating precedes selection of the food and eating precedes payment, while in self-service these orders are reversed. More radically: differentiation to a drive-in hamburger shop, where seating is replaced by staying in the car.
Summing up: The script models organizations in a way which unpacks notions of organizational routines, competencies, product quality, dedicated assets, economy of scope. It offers the basis for a multi-level theory of people, firms, industries and economies.
The notion of a script also offers a precise idea of what organizational cognition may be, beyond individual cognition: organizational cognition is embodied in the script, while individual cognition is substituted into nodes. This solves a problem in the literature, which has often backed away from the idea that organizations have knowledge, in some sense, other than some unspecified aggregate of the knowledge of individuals in the organization (Cook & Yanow 1993) . Winter (1882, quoted by Hodgson 1998) also recognized that individual knowledge is operative only in the context of the constellation of other people in the organization. In my rendering: it needs to fit into a node that is aligned with nodes into which others substitute their knowledge. Emphatically, this does not entail that a person's personal knowledge is exhausted by what he contributes to a node of an organizational script according to the role assigned to him. By the principle of recursiveness, what a person contributes derives from the scripts that constitute his categorial apparatus, which also includes his cognition "qua persona", and this yields spill-overs into his organizational role that constitute a source of both error and innovation. The scope for this depends on how strictly his organizational role is specified and onitored, which is less to the extent that his role demands autonomy, for example as a "knowledge worker" (Hodgson 1998) . Elsewhere (Nooteboom 1992 ) I argued that the reason for the existence of a firm is not only, and not primarily, to reduce transaction costs, but to act as a "focusing device" for the alignment of personal cognitions. The notion of organizational scripts yields a further specification of this.
We can also use scripts to reconstruct metaphor. A metaphor provides a link between two previously unconnected fields of meaning (Miall, 1982; Neisser, 1987) . In metaphor, a given subject ("principal subject", "tenor", "target") is talked about in terms ordinarily used to describe a subject of another type ("secondary subject", "vehicle", "base"). The tenor is represented in a new light, in terms of the vehicle. Or, in other words, a concept (vehicle) is applied to something (target) outside of its ordinary domain. Metaphor can now be interpreted as substitution across scripts: a term that is normally substituted in a node in a "base" script, in "literal reference", is substituted into a different "target" script. It is relevant to establish this connection, because it entails that our principle of "reciprocation" has the same logical form as metaphor. In other words: something very much like metaphor is one of the principles of abduction. The importance of metaphor for innovation was recognized by Nonaka (1995) .
A model of learning
I can now specify in more detail how the principles of abduction work. The problem of abduction now is: how can a script function as a selection environment, in the form of organizational competence within the firm, and in the form of a techno-economic paradigm in an industry, and yet be transformed as the script functions. In terms of scripts the "logic" of change can now be specified as follows: -Consolidation. Old scripts have been broken up. There is no longer a dominant design that operates as a stringent selection environment. But a novel, recently invented script is indeterminate in the sense that the identification and sequencing of nodes (architecture), and effective substitutions into them are unstable: best practice is not yet clear. The novel script is messed up with mismatches between elements from the original scripts. Nodes or substitutions are included that do not belong, or nodes are put in the wrong order. But there is no existing norm or model to identify this, and increase of effectiveness or efficiency is a matter of learning by experimenting. As experimentation proceeds, more insight is gained from repeated trials in the context in which the script was first conceived and found to be successful to some extent. By experimentation, the best selection, sequencing and substitutions of nodes are established, and this yields a "dominant design". Efficiency increases by the elimination of redundant nodes and inappropriate substitutions, and a narrowing down to optimal and parsimonious procedures. This yields increasing efficiency, along "experience curves" (Yelle 1979 ). This gives a reasonable rendering of the notion of "first order" learning. Once such a dominant design has been established, it functions as the new selection environment. -Generalization. Next, the script is applied in novel contexts. Further streamlining of the dominant design occurs, and on the basis of expanded demand economies of scale are reaped, and specialization occurs: the breaking up of nodes into specialized pieces. -Differentiation. As the script is applied in novel contexts, differentiation occurs to adapt to those differences, in the form of different substitutions into nodes in different contexts. For example: to adjust for differences in capabilities or desires of customers, capabilities of labour, sources of energy, available materials, technology of maintenance and support, technical standards, etc. This type of change can appropriately be called "parametric differentiation" (Langlois & Robertson 1995) . This will generally develop into a branching of a general script into different branches for different contexts. Thus, in the restaurant script there are different branches of self service and service. Together, the stages of generalization and differentiation can be seen as "incremental" innovation, which is cumulative: building upon past performance. -Reciprocation. As anomalies and misfits accumulate, the boundaries of the script's potential become visible, and observations accumulate which indicate that elements (nodes) from other practices
is adopted from supermarkets by restaurants. -Novel combinations; accommodation. As differentiation and reciprocation proceed, scripts become messy, inefficient and inconsistent. There is a proliferation of alternative branches for different contexts, the same nodes appear at different locations in the architecture, different nodes have overlapping substitutions, opportunities for utilizing economy of scale are missed, there is an accumulation of anomalies, novel substitutions are not utilized to their full potential in the nodes as they are defined and located in the architecture. More precisely: the constraints imposed by the need to fit in the architecture inhibit uses that would make better use of their potential. To allow for that, constraints have to be modified, but this has implications for the substitutions allowed in other nodes. Substitutions are reassembled into new nodes, and nodes are reconfigured into new architectures. Changes reverberate through the architecture, in several iterations, leading up to a novel architecture. Here we are back at the initial stage of consolidation. At the beginning of this stage knowledge is largely tacit. During consolidation a novel "technological regime" develops (dominant design), with documented knowledge and standardized procedures (Boisot 1995) .
In the present article I focus on the level of the industry, and analyse learning in the firm only in so far as needed for that purpose. On the industry level, the script represents firms substituting their products into nodes of industry networks of production: materials, machineries and instruments, business services, intermediary and final products, and distribution, communication and retailing to end users. It represents the "techno-economic paradigm" that governs an industry, and constitutes the selection environment of firms: firms survive to the extent that their activities fit in the industry script.
An example is the development of the semiconductor industry (Stoelhorst 1997) . It started with the transistor as a substitute for the vacuum tube. In the script model: a novel substitution into the node of amplification, in scripts representing the architecture of a radio. But its potential went further: its greater reliability, greater speed, lower power usage and heat dissipation opened up opportunities for much more complex electrical systems. But the manual soldering of the connections between the discrete components formed a bottleneck: it was expensive and generated too many errors. Ultimately, the answer was to make a range of components (resistors and capacitors next to amplifiers) in ther same silicon technology, and integrate them in an overall system including connections between them. This constituted a major architectural change.
Processes on the firm level and the industry level are linked. Radically novel substitutions into nodes of industrial scripts, by firms offering novel products, result from architectural changes at the firm level, although these will in general not yet have consolidated. To the extent that the industrial script cannot accept the novel substitution without changes elsewhere in its structure (the innovation is systemic), the innovation has trouble in gaining acceptance. Its early use may occur where its fit into the prevailing architecture is feasible with a minimum of systemic changes rather than where it is most productive. This explains how innovations often realize their potential only in due course, and in areas distant from first usage.
We need to address the issue of conservatism. I proposed that innovation requires a build-up of incentives and the material (elements, directions) for change. But these conditions are not always sufficient. Can a given practice (firm, industry) ignore these pressures, and maintain the status quo? Presumably, that depends on the classic features of market structure: intensity of competition, concentration and entry barriers. But how does this connect with firm behaviour? Which firms come up with novelty; how does the change of their firm level scripts proceed? How do they sow the seeds of destruction of the incumbent industrial script while it still constitutes the selection environment? How does novelty diffuse across firms? What is the role of firm size and structure? What is the role of location? For this we need to consider the issue of knowledge transfer, and the role of distance.
nowledge Transfer
Organizational scripts can be documented up to a point by inspection, analysis and mapping of processes of production, administration and communication in firms. However, this has its limits, and this further specifies the notion of "causal ambiguity" (Lippman & Rumelt 1982) . In organizations as in people, scripts may be tacit (Polanyi 1962 (Polanyi , 1966 (Polanyi , 1969 ; not known explicitly to anyone. In the stages of accommodation and consolidation they are not stable nor clearly defined. In organizations, people participate in a node of a script, perhaps without anyone grasping the script as a whole. The distinction between tacit and documented knowledge is closely related to the distinction between "procedural" and "declarative" knowledge (Cohen & Bacdayan 1994 , Cohen 1991 . Procedural knowledge constitutes an ability or skill to perform some activity. Declarative knowledge constitutes explicit knowledge of facts, causal relations, etc. One can have the one without the other. One can ride a bike without being able to explain how. Procedural knowledge tends to be retained longer than declarative knowledge. Having learned a foreign language, later one can often recognize whether a sentence is well-formed, without recalling the grammatical rules for sentence formation (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994) . Then one can say that one knows the grammar in the procedural but not in the declarative sense.
Corresponding to the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge, there are different ways of obtaining (learning) or transferring (teaching) a script. With tacit knowledge one needs to learn procedurally, as an apprentice, by imitating observed behaviour of one or more "masters", in a "community of practice" (Brown & Duguid 1991) , and trying it out in practice, subject to correction by that community. When knowledge is documented, one can learn declaratively, by studying a blueprint of the script, as a standard operating procedure, encoded in some form. A necessary condition for this is that the practice has settled down in a dominant design. However, since due to the principle of recursiveness at some level of nesting tacit elements are inevitable, formal training is never completely successful if it is not accompanied by socialization in a community of practice. It follows that training to a greater or lesser extent always requires some degree of socialization. This distinction between the two types of learning was already recognized by Penrose (1959) .
The script model enables us to be more precise about why practices are never completely reducible to documented knowledge. The principle of recursiveness implies that practices (scripts) have an inevitable tacit component at some level in the nesting of subscripts. Complete, declarative transmission of a practice would yield a regress: one would need to specify all subscripts and superscripts, but in any finite explanation one cannot keep on explaining the terms of the explanation. Good practice, with all its inveterately tacit elements, its rich experience with specializations for different contexts, with corresponding "work-arounds", cannot be completely canonized into written procedures, manuals or training programmes, without any unspecified residual (Brown & Duguid 1991) . It is one of the pitfalls of management to think that it can be. The inadequacy of that view is illustrated when processes break down because people "work to rule". It is also illustrated in the insight that for diffusion of knowledge in a firm it may be better to rotate staff than to issue written rules or procedures (Cohen & Bacdayan 1994) .
There is a further reason why competence often requires that at least on some level of nesting (sub)practices are tacit. This can be explained by Simon's principle of bounded rationality: since our capacity for rational evaluation is limited, it is efficient to routinize practices to some extent, by developing it into tacit knowledge, and to focus rational evaluation on novel challenges. In fact, we now have two notions of tacitness, which arise in different stages of development. The first is that in the stage of novel combinations and (early) consolidation the practice cannot be explained because while it is found to work under certain conditions, one does not understand why or even precisely how. The second is that after consolidation, in generalization, it becomes a routine, which may sink to such a deep level that it becomes unexplainable "second nature".
Generally, when firms grow large, with the need and opportunity of delegation and specialization in different activities in different departments, procedural knowledge with its direct, face to face visual and oral coordination and communication no longer suffice, and ways of doing things ust be made explicit and explainable, i.e. must be turned into declarative knowledge, and must be documented to form instructions and standard operating procedures across departments or subsidiaries. In other words: transformation into declarative knowledge and codification are required for diffusion over large distances and many people. But this documentation can only be achieved (and then not fully, as argued before) after a dominant design has emerged in the stage of consolidation. In other words: formalized procedures in large scale organization and division of labour can work only after consolidation.
Cognitive distance
Now consider the notion of "cognitive distance" as a generalized notion of distance, with cognitive "proximity" as its inverse. Cognitive proximity enables understanding. But there must also be novelty, and hence sufficient cognitive distance, since otherwise the knowledge is redundant: nothing new is learned. If we specify effectiveness of communication as the (mathematical) product of communicability and novelty, learning is most effective at a distance which is neither too large nor too small, as illustrated in figure 3. 
This diagramme reflects Granovetter's (1982) notion of the "strength of weak ties": weak ties have the advantage of yielding more novelty or "non-redundance", but understanding may be complicated by lack of shared experience. In particular when knowledge is tacit, strong ties, based on enduring and intensive interaction, may be needed. Strong ties are also needed when the innovation is systemic, i.e. needs to be "in tune" with changes in other nodes in a script. On the other hand, strong ties may not only have the disadvantage of adding little novelty, but also of generating too much personal interaction and loyalty, to the detriment of productive work, criticism and flexibility.
Elsewhere (Nooteboom 1992 ) I proposed the notion of "external economy of cognitive scope". If knowledge is contingent upon categories of thought, and these develop in interaction with the physical and social environment, then thought is path-dependent and idiosyncratic. People will be able to understand each other only to the extent that they have developed their categories in a shared environment and in mutual interaction. It also entails that there are things that one simply cannot see and interpret in the way that others can. Therefore, not to miss out on the perception of relevant opportunities and threats one needs to tap into the complementary cognition of others. This entails scope `ì n the sense of complementarity, the scope is cognitive, and it is external: it is essential that the external source have a sufficiently different cognitive history to yield non-redundant cognition. Hence: "external economy of cognitive scope".
The reason for using external partners thus goes far beyond the notion of static efficiency based on economy of scale from specialization that transaction cost economics (TCE) takes into account. While TCE argues that greater uncertainty yields an argument for integration of an activity within the firm, this argument states the opposite: great uncertainty, in the sense of not being able to see, interpret and evaluate one's environment, necessitates the use of external sources.
The net value of weak ties depends on a trade-off between the advantages of non-redundancy, lower costs and greater flexibility, and the disadvantage of problematic transfer when the knowledge is tacit and/or systemic (not stand-alone). Teece (1986 , 1988 , Chesbrough and Teece 1996 proposed that especially in case of systemic innovation the trade-off is in favour of strong ties, favoring more integrated firm structures. But the argument is not always valid. The trade-off favours weak ties to the extent that the innovation involved is more radical. If radical innovation involves novel combinations, the advantage of non-redundancy is more important, and the problem in the transfer of systemic knowledge is not relevant because the old systemic coherence is destroyed. Strong ties align with existing systemic connections, and thereby obstruct novel combinations. Also, when novel combinations are in order, you take the problem of the difficulty of transferring tacit knowledge in novel contacts for granted, because although the strong ties may provide a better basis for it, those again do not cover the novel connections required. There, one can very efficiently transfer tacit knowledge but it is not innovative. But it is then to be accepted that the build-up of understanding and a joint "community of practice" is needed, to transfer or connect tacit knowledge between two partners.
A necessary condition for spatial distance to be irrelevant is that there is sufficient absorptive capacity in spite of it. In the script model: the receiver's scripts must be able to assimilate the transferred data to yield proper interpretation and understanding. If knowledge is declarative and documented it can be easily transferred. The transfer of more tacit and procedural knowledge requires richer media (mutual observation of conduct, on line feed-back) and embedding in the "community of practice". The development of communication technology goes in that direction (multi media), but in many cases not sufficiently: one would need to simulate direct physical interaction on the spot. Virtual reality may get us there, but that will take some time yet. And even then exchange of tacit knowledge is easier to the extent that there is more shared experience, and this is determined by cultural proximity (which correlates to greater or lesser extent with spatial proximity).
The implicit assumption so far was that one already knows what one should communicate, and with whom. But in the stage of reciprocation, in my logic of change, chance encounters play a role, and for this one needs more or less unstructured interaction of people meeting each other pell-mell in a context of roughly shared interest and frequently (like scientists at a conference, or firms in an industrial district). While this seems to require at least occasional physical proximity, so that spatial distance matters, perhaps INTERNET begins to provide such a facility at a distance.
A further reason why distance may still matter is that exchange of knowledge also requires trust. To build up knowledge exchange one must develop common understanding, which to a greater or lesser extent constitutes a relation specific investment. As explained in transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985) , this yields a need for governance. In the creation of novel combinations (accommodation) and ongoing experimentation in search of a dominant design (consolidation), it is counterproductive to utilize formal instruments of control, in the form of detailed, legal contracts, procedures for monitoring, and credible threats of litigation. It is not only difficult and costly, especially for small firms, to handle this instrument. It also threatens to stifle the relations between participants and block rather than support the required exploration by trial and error. If you do not yet know precisely what cooperation will yield, because you engage in cooperation to develop novelty, you cannot specify precisely the obligations that participants should fulfil. Too detailed and formal contracts may seriously inhibit the growth of trust. Thus, particularly in the stages of accommodation and consolidation, one must seek recourse to alternative mechanisms of control: reputation mechanisms, exchange of hostages nd trust. These yield more flexibility and economize on the costs of governance (Nooteboom 1996) . In these forms of governance small firms have less of a disadvantage, and in some respects even an advantage, compared to large firms. Further, for such forms of governance distance matters: reputation, trust and bonding are best achieved at small spatial, cognitive and cultural distance. Trust is either based on ex ante shared norms and values, or bonds of friendship or kinship, or is built up in a relation, in what Zucker (1986) called "process based trust". The first requires shared culture, the second clan or family membership, and the third is greatly enhanced by local, face to face interaction. Trust is also important when there is risk of spill-over in knowledge exchange.
Locational patterns of industry and agglomeration effects have been ascribed to geological factors (natural resources), geographical factors (e.g. population characteristics, infrastructure), cultural factors (e.g. religion), climate, and economic factors (e.g. size of market, transaction costs). As early as 1920, Marshall distinguished three economic factors: concentration of related firms offers a "pooled" market for specialized labour, facilitates the development of specialized products and services, and allows firms to profit from externalities in the form of "spill-overs". Here, we look at further, more detailed factors that can be derived from our theory of learning. They are related in particular to the third factor from Marshall: spill-overs between firms. Note a fundamental difference between my "external economy of cognitive scope" and Marshall's notion of external economy of learning. The latter notion refers to spill-over, i.e. the speed and efficiency of the acquisition of "information", as some cognitive commodity that one could have obtained otherwise, but then more slowly or expensively. My principle refers to the filling of gaps that due to the pathdependence and ensuing idiosyncracy of one's categorial apparatus one could not have filled (any more than a camel could decide to be a horse).
Summing up: distance, including spatial distance, still matters when chance encounters, transfer of tacit knowledge or trust are important. The first applies in the stage of reciprocation, and the latter two apply in the stages of accommodation and consolidation.
Industrial organization
Now I return to the question: what conditions and what firms effect the break-out from established paradigms? I will argue that this is determined by the combination of two variables: degree of integration and location.
In his early work Schumpeter (1909) proposed that innovation is achieved by new, small, entrepreneurial firms. Later (1939 Later ( , 1943 he proposed that innovation is primarily the product of large firms in concentrated industries. Empirical research also has produced mixed results over many years (Mansfield 1969 , Davis, Hill & Laforge 1985 , Wyatt 1985 , Rothwell 1985 , Acs & Audretsch 1990 , Kamien & Schwarz 1982 , Baldwin & Scott 1987 , Nooteboom 1991 , Nooteboom & Vossen 1995 , Vossen & Nooteboom 1996 , Vossen 1996 , Brouwer 1997 . I propose that all this can be explained by the hypothesis that small and large firms have different strengths in different stages of development, and complement each other.
But we have to careful here. In fact, the relevant variable is not firm size, but degree of integration and the strength of links. In my script model: number of nodes and constraints on their linkages. Large firms with decentralized, autonomous divisions, reaching their extreme in so-called "virtual" firms (such as Benetton), are close to industrial districts. Between highly centralized large firms and autonomous small firms there are the intermediate modes of virtual firms and industrial districts. It is important to make this distinction, because it indicates that large firms can survive or indeed create the discontinuities of novel combinations by means of decentralization of highly autonomous divisions or even individual "intrapreneurs", and by taking over innovative small firms as soon as their success has become apparent. In this way large firms can prey upon the risk taking of reckless small firms. Thus small firms provide an externality of recklessness. However, there are limits to the variety that can be created and sustained in a large firm. How can one foresee the kinds of variety that might become relevant? In the extreme case, to create that variety the large firm would have to engage n practically everything, allowing for any combinations, and what then remains of the notion of an organizational script? It would become a script with no limitations to nodes and their substitutions, no architecture, and one could no longer speak of a firm.
Accommodation entails a redefinition and a reconfiguration of nodes into novel scripts, and hence requires a break-up of existing scripts (creative destruction). Consolidation requires that mistaken forms of novelty are efficiently selected out. For several reasons, to be discussed below, disintegrated structures of spatially proximate units, such as industrial districts, are conducive to this. On the other hand, the more cumulative progress of generalization across larger distances, with increase of scale, specialization of tasks and the development of novel systemic coherence favours the more integrated structure, with stronger ties, such as the large firm. Note that this applies both to systemic coherence in production, because the integrated structure commands scripts with more nodes that need to cohere, and to systemic coherence in the product, because the integrated structure can offer a coherent system of dimensions of use. An example of the latter is telecommunications, where the large firm can offer a system of different components of hard-and software. This yields the thesis of "dynamic complementarity": in the process of innovation integrated and disintegrated structures play complementary roles; they have comparative advantage in different stages of the development process (Rothwell 1985 , Nooteboom 1994 . This thesis is elaborated below.
In the stage of novel combinations, large, integrated structures are good at the development of basic inventions, on the basis of basic science, in large laboratories with complex installations, because of the specialization, scale and cumulative experience in research that it requires. Small, autonomous units are often better at the commercialization of opportunities resulting from that research, in a large variety of novel combinations. As I indicated before, creative destruction requires motive and opportunity. The motive is higher for new, small, autonomous units, especially small firms, due to their lesser imprisonment in past success and exisitng scripts, or in other words lesser embedment in an established "techno-economic paradigm", due to their novel emergence, fewer vested interests, with a narrower range of products and markets, and their greater variety of purpose, perspective and modus operandi. This variety is due to their greater independence from the established regimes of markets for capital, corporate control and managers (Nooteboom 1994) . Note, however, that this diversity of small business also entails that they do not all conform to the image of the Schumpeterian hero as the creator of destruction. Studies indicate that only some 10 to 20% of small business is entrepreneurial in that sense (Nooteboom 1994) . Small firms often stay behind in old technologies and markets. That has a positive and a negative explanation, The positive one is that residual markets can be profitable, with diehard consumers sticking to the old fashion, and with small volumes that do not offer competitors the opportunity for economy of scale. The negative one is that many small firms are not like the Schumpeterian hero at all, and use their independence to maintain traditional ways of doing things. Paradoxically perhaps, the innovative force of entrepreneurial small business is due also to their lesser rationality of evaluation; a greater impulsiveness, for lack of critical scrutiny from supervisory boards and layers of specialized, professional hierarchy. In an attempt at ex ante selection, those weed out ill founded schemes that constitute error as well as what later would have turned out to be successful radical innovations.
Concerning opportunity, and taking into account the role of distance discussed before: novel combinations are promoted by a constellation of separate, relatively small, weakly connected, spatially proximate units in complementary activities ("industrial districts"). In such constellations, a number of requirements are satisfied. Sufficient cognitive proximity (to be able to understand each other) and trust (to do without complex, detailed, costly, constraining contracts, and to contain risks of spill-over) is achieved on the basis of shared norms and values of conduct, the bonding of family, clan or friendship, an efficient reputation mechanism, the "shadow of the future" from expected dealings with each other in the future, shared routines. Sufficient cognitive distance (to offer each other novel insights) is achieved by variety in activity and experience. There is sufficient spatial proximity to allow for frequent and varied contacts, and for intensive interaction in partial joint production, needed for the transfer of tacit, procedural knowledge, which is characteristic of the early stages of innovation. pportunity is also related to the absence of disadvantages of disintegrated structures that arise at other stages of development. Small, independent units are not so good at orchestrating many parts of a system to innovate in tune (Teece 1986 , 1988 , Chesbrough and Teece 1996 , but as I indicated before, since we are dealing here with radical innovations, in "novel combinations", which break up existing systems, that yields no obstacle. Tacit, procedural knowledge has the disadvantage of lacking the basis for formalized procedures with documented communication that is needed for large scale production, with specialization across a firm's departments. But at the early stage of innovation both the opportunity and the need for large scale are absent. No opportunity because the market is still small. No need because due to initial monopoly pressure from competition is low.
In the stage of consolidation, with the search for a dominant design, it is important that there is flexibility to try out various combinations and forms, and that misfits are efficiently weeded out. Here also lies the strength of the variety and idiosyncracy of small, independent firms, and the fact that misfits cannot be kept alive by cross-subsidization from successful products in a portfolio of products. Here we run into a second restriction to the mimicry of industrial districts by large firms: the efficiency of the elimination of failures, in ex post selection, becomes doubtful due to the possiblity of propping them up with cross-subsidization. In that sense they are not efficient from a societal perspective, but that of course still leaves the possibility for their existence. Depending on the selection environment of markets and institutions such practices are not necessarily weeded out. Examples of small firms running ahead in commercialization are: semi-conductors and computer aided design (Rothwell & Zegveld 1985) , micro computers (Langlois & Robertson 1990 ) self-service retailing (Nooteboom 1984) .
However, in the stage of generalization, after consolidation, integrated structures are better at large volume production and distribution of novel products, in wider world markets. A dominant design emerges, the opportunity arises for transformation of tacit, procedural knowledge into declarative, documented knowledge, which allows for transfer across larger distances. At the same time, increase of scale is feasible with the growth of demand, and is necessary to reduce costs due to increasing competition, as patents wear out and imitation increases. This favours larger production units, integrated distribution channels, spreading of risks, access to finance and the umbrella of a brand name, on the basis of penetration into extended markets. This favours a larger, more international and more integrated firm, with tight control of interfaces between scripts. Integrated structures are also better at the development of more coherent systems of connecting technologies, distribution systems, industry structures, supporting infrastructure, technical and commercial standards, yielding the configuration of a novel techno-economic paradigm.
Next, as generalization turns into differentiation and reciprocation, comparative advantage shifts again to a greater variety of scripts, in more autonomous divisions, subsidiaries or independent firms, to give space to the generation of variety by reciprocation, in preparation of the next round of more fundamental innovation. Differentiation of products and processes also contributes to an escape from pure price competition between identical products that developed from generalization 3 . Small firms, or independent units within large firms, are better at product differentiation in niche markets, where they do not run into disadvantages of small scale and can benefit from flexibility and proximity to customers.
According to my logic of learning, the generalization by integrated structures and the differentiation by disintegrated structures yield the wide dispersion across varying contexts and the corresponding differentiations that provide the accumulation of misfits and hints for novel elements for novel combinations. And then we need the variety and idiosyncracy of disintegrated structures again, to 3 Of course not all products are equally amenable to differentiation; some are inherently homogeneous "commodities". But even there attempts at differentiation are made in dimensions surrounding the core product, such as service, image, status. Oil companies manage to create an image of differentiation even for oil, which is as homogeneous a commodity as one can find.
`b reak up existing systems, in creative destruction. We need disintegrated structures to create variety of practice and experiments, and integrated structures to carry dominant designs to a variety of contexts. Along these lines I propose a cycle theory of integration and disintegration, based on the cycle theory of learning. This is illustrated in figure 4. The analysis does not imply that disintegrated constellations are always the best. See Amin's criticism of the claim of universal superiority of flexible specialization (Amin 1989) . First of all, as indicated, they have a comparative disadvantage in the later stages of consolidation and in generalization. Furthermore, in other stages large firms can to a certain extent mimic the advantages of industrial disricts and flexible specialization. For this they need to maintain sufficient autonomy and variety of units within the firm, with suffiently weak ties, while also utilizing opportunities for systemic alignment, with strong ties, in the later stages of consolidation and in the stage of generalization. It seems necessary to also maintain a readiness to mop up succesful small innovators, in order to tap into a variety of independent firms that would be hard to reproduce within the firm. In this way it is conceivable that a large firm combines the best of two worlds. While it is not easy to perform this balancing act (Nooteboom 1989) , it is conceivable, and indeed appears to be achieved by firms such as 3M company and INTEL.
Conclusion
I have presented a "logic" of change, based on principles of "abduction", which applies to different levels (people, firms, industries, economies), and shows how these different levels are linked. I claim that this gives the generally best heuristic for dealing with the problem of abduction; with the question how to maintain continuity in order to survive on the basis of existing competencies (exploitation) while preparing for their change (exploration), by exploring their limits of validity in novel contexts and gathering elements and hints for novel combinations. The heuristic consists of several stages: in consolidation variety of a novel, emerging practice is reduced (yielding a "dominant design"), in generalization applications diffuse (yielding economies of scale and experience), differentiation opens the practice up to variety of application in novel contexts generated by generalization, reciprocation yields metaphorical transfer from other, parallel practices, and these yield the material and directions for novel combinations. The incentive for such novelty comes from declining profits after diffusion, diminishing returns and increasing inefficiencies in grafting changes onto old structures, and opportunity costs of not fully utilizing the potential of the novel elements added on.
In the present article the focus was on the level of industries. The main result is that the cycle of learning generates a cycle of organizational integration and disintegration. For several reasons it is often `s mall, new, outsider firms (in industrial districts) that effect the novel combinations, and large firms have comparative advantage in generalization, in a "dynamic complementarity" of small and large firms. This resolves Schumpeter's ambiguity concerning the role of large versus small firms in innovation.
Or to put the story more succinctly: a narrowing variety of practice is needed to achieve standardization for efficiency through scale and experience, and for transfer to a variety of contexts which generate the incentives, the insights and the material for generating a new variety of practice. Variety of practice narrows down to yield generalization to a variety of context which yields material and incentive for a novel variety of practice. And all the while you survive by ongoing production. Small firms generate the variety of practice; large firms generate the variety of context.
The theory is still in its infancy. It has had a long incubation, with a first attempt at presenting it in a publication ten years ago (Nooteboom 1989) . I have made some novel combinations, from economic evolution, the resource/competence view, transaction cost economics and cognitive science, but there is not yet a "dominant design". Most of the work still has to be done. I tried to make the principles more determinate in terms of scripts. These help to indicate the relations between levels by a priciple of recursion: lower level scripts supply substitutions into nodes of higher level scripts. This also helps to show why there is always tacit knowledge on some level. It creates an isomorphism between the notion of reciprocation and the notion of metaphor, and thus helps to model the role of metaphorization in learning and innovation. It serves to model how technology and knowledge are embedded in organization, how organizational level knowledge transcends individual knowledge, and how labour is subjected to greater or lesser control for the sake of coordination while yet having a residual of cognition "qua persona" which is a source of both innovation and error. But nevertheless, perhaps some other, more general structure will turn out to be better. Presently, attempts are under way to formalize the theory in more general and more rigorous terms, on the basis of a modern intensional logic of "replacement systems" (Aczel 1990) .
The article has concentrated on theory. There is much work to be done in empirical testing.
